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The Posse Comitatus Act and
the Fourth Amendment’s
Exclusionary Rule
Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Walsh and Paul Sullivan

I. INTRODUCTION

The United States has, throughout its history, continually called upon
the U.S. military to deploy inside the United States to respond to disasters, to protect citizens in times of war, and even to perform acts of
law enforcement during civil unrest. At the same time, Americans
have a long-standing and inherent distrust of the use of the military
on U.S. soil, particularly for law enforcement activities. These two
competing interests—to use the military in times of need but restrict
its domestic use for law enforcement—have created a mix of court
cases that apply different tests to determine when the military has exceeded its legal authority to operate inside the United States.
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The court’s primary tool for restricting the use of the military as
domestic law enforcement is to use the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule to suppress evidence gathered in violation of the
restrictions on the domestic use of the military. Recently, the Supreme
Court has reevaluated and restricted the application of the exclusionary rule. The Court has emphasized that the exclusionary rule should
be judiciously applied to suppress evidence of criminal activity.
Courts need to follow this recent Supreme Court guidance and recognize that the exclusionary rule should not be used to suppress
evidence derived from the domestic use of the military.
This article will examine both the use of the military inside the
United States and the recent restrictions on applying the exclusionary
rule to deter government violations of law. The article will highlight
where these areas of the law intersect in the courts—when criminal
defendants seek the application of the exclusionary rule to exclude
evidence gathered while the military was engaged in an impermissible act of law enforcement. By examining recent military operations
inside the United States and looking at the evolving development of
the exclusionary rule, there is a clear answer: the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule is misused when courts apply it to the military’s domestic law enforcement activity.
Section II will examine the development of the use—and misuse—
of the military inside the United States to conduct law enforcement
activity. Section III will explore the development of the exclusionary
rule, including the recent Supreme Court opinions that have emphasized the exclusionary rule’s limited purpose. Section IV will examine
the recent judicial applications of the exclusionary rule to law
enforcement activity by the military, and review how the lower courts
are ruling in a manner that is inconsistent with current Supreme Court
guidance on the exclusionary rule. Section V will synthesize these two
conflicts and explain how the exclusionary rule is an ineffective and
sometimes counterproductive mechanism to deter law enforcement
activity by the military.
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II. DOMESTIC MILITARY OPERATIONS AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT

Throughout its history, the United States has had a complicated relationship with the use of the military for domestic law enforcement.
Some of the primary complaints against Great Britain that preceded
the Declaration of Independence involved the use of the British military inside the Colonies.1 Despite this unease, the U.S. Constitution
anticipates and permits the domestic use of the military.2 Congress
sanctioned the use of the military to enforce the law early on in U.S.
history.3 The controversy continued during and after the American
Civil War, when Congress initially reaffirmed the domestic use of the
military to enforce the law and later criminalizing use of the military
for domestic law enforcement.4 Exploring the tension about the need
to use the military for law enforcement and the concerns over doing
so will be explored in this section.
A. The Declaration of Independence, the Articles
of Confederation, and the U.S. Constitution
In the years before the drafting of the Constitution and the passing of
the Bill of Rights, America struggled with the role of military in
domestic affairs.5 American colonists objected to the use of the British
Army to enforce British law and supplant the civil law of the
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 13, 16 (U.S. 1776); David McCullough,
JOHN ADAMS 65 (2001); Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right
to Civil Law Enforcement, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 383, 389–92 (2003).
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. II, § 2; id. art. IV, § 4.
3 Calling Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 (repealed 1795); Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36,
1 Stat. 424 (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–35 (2000)).
4 See Gary Felicetti & John Luce, The Posse Comitatus Act: Setting the Record Straight on
124 Years of Mischief and Misunderstanding Before Any More Damage Is Done, 175 MIL. L.
REV. 86, 95–96 (2003) (explaining that the sheriff’s power to use the military in law
enforcement pre-dated the Framers’ concern over centralized power at the time the
Constitution was drafted).
5 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 13, 16 (U.S. 1776); see U.S. CONST. amend.
III; ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, arts. VI, VII, IX; Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 22–
23 (1972); David E. Engdahl, Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution: The Law and History of Military
Troops in Civil Disorders, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1971); Clarence I. Meeks, III, Illegal Law
Enforcement: Aiding Civil Authorities in Violation of the Posse Comitatus Act, 70 MIL. L. REV.
83, 86 (1975).
1
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Colonies.6 The Articles of Confederation, the Constitution, and the
amendments to the Constitution included law that restricted and limited the power and use of the military.7 At the same time, the early
Congresses authorized presidents to use the military on U.S. soil to
battle insurrectionists, respond to threats, and even enforce some federal laws.8 The first leaders of America struggled, much as today’s
leaders have, to define the proper use of the military for domestic
activities.9
i. The Declaration of Independence and Its Objections to
the Military as a Law Enforcement Body
Colonists who moved from Great Britain to the New World brought
with them ideas that the military should not be used for domestic law
enforcement.10 Consequently, these colonists believed they were being
treated unjustly when King George sent the British Army into the
colonial cities to enforce British law and order.11 The British Army
occupied the city of Boston from 1768 to 1770 to exert control over the
unruly colonists and enforce British taxes.12 The perceived injustice of
being subject to military enforcement of civil law increased opposition
to the British monarchy. Rather than decrease opposition, the employment of British troops in law enforcement actually led to an increase
in violence between occupying British forces and the colonists.13

Kealy, supra note 1, at 389–92.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 13, 16 (U.S. 1776); see U.S. CONST. amend.
III; ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, arts. VI, VII, IX; Laird, 408 U.S. at 22–23;
Engdahl, supra note 5, at 1; Meeks, supra note 5, at 86 (discussing the Framers’ concerns
over military involvement in the lives of civilians absent civilian control).
8 Calling Forth Act of 1792; Militia Act of 1795; Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 119;
Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, 1 Stat. 96.
9 See generally BENNETT MILTON RICH, PRESIDENTS AND CIVIL DISORDER 21, 25–26 (1941)
(discussing the use of troops to quell Fries’s Rebellion).
10 See Engdahl, supra note 5, at 1 (describing the role of due process in preventing the
use of military force in suppressing civil disorders); see also FAITH THOMPSON, MAGNA
CARTA: ITS ROLE IN THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, 1300–1629, at 68 (1948);
MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 49 (2d ed. 1716).
11 Kealy, supra note 1, at 390.
12 Id. at 389–92.
13 MCCULLOUGH, supra note 1, at 65.
6
7
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On March 5, 1770, when British troops and colonists confronted
each other amid protests in Boston, the troops fired, killing five men.14
This use of British troops as a “force of uniformed peace-keepers, or
policemen,” which resulted in the death of protesters, came to be
known as the “Boston Massacre.”15 Despite the public outcry following the deaths, British troops continued to patrol the streets of the
Colonies and enforce British taxes and regulations through the
1770s.16
Six years after the Boston Massacre, Thomas Jefferson included
grievances in the Declaration of Independence that cited the misuse of
the British troops for law enforcement.17 Jefferson’s list of grievances
included the keeping of “standing armies” in times of peace, rendering the British military “independent of and superior to the Civil
power,” and “quartering of large bodies of armed troops among us.”18
These concerns were remembered when the founding republic established its first government with the passage of the Articles of
Confederation.
ii. The Articles of Confederation and Their
Restrictions on the Military
The Articles of Confederation—in establishing the first national
government for the United States—reflected the Founding Fathers’
concerns over the domestic use of the military.19 The Articles required
that, in peacetime, the Armed Forces must be limited only to the size
that was absolutely necessary for the national defense and that the
military must always be subject to civilian control.20 The Articles
favored the traditional state militias (with part-time soldiers instead
of professionals) and with officers appointed by and beholden to the

Id. at 65–66; HILLER B. ZOBEL, THE BOSTON MASSACRE 135 (Easton Press 1987) (1971).
ZOBEL, supra note 14, at 135.
16 See Meeks, supra note 5, at 86.
17 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 13, 16 (U.S. 1776).
18 Id.
19 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, arts. VI, VII, IX (establishing civilian control
of the military and limiting military size based on national defense needs).
20 Id.
14
15
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States for their position.21 These restrictions along with a weak central
government were insufficient to protect the nation and the Founding
Fathers convened again to create an improved and stronger central
government.
iii. The U.S. Constitution and Its Regulation of
the Military
The U.S. Constitution granted broader powers to the federal government to raise and maintain a military, but it also maintained prior
safeguards that regulated the use of the military inside the United
States.22 During the Constitutional Convention, some delegates raised
concerns about permitting a standing army, but the majority overruled these concerns.23 The Constitution granted Congress the power
to raise a standing army, but imposed safeguards on it from both the
legislative and executive branch.24 The new Constitution also gave the
military a domestic role, to “suppress Insurrections” and, perhaps, to
protect against “domestic Violence.”25 These constitutional provisions
raised some concerns about the misuse of the military inside the
United States, and states called for a “Bill of Rights” to amend the
Constitution to address these concerns.26
The Bill of Rights created additional restrictions on the domestic
use of the military to address the fears of misuse.27 The Second
Amendment guaranteed a well-regulated militia loyal to the states,
and the right for citizens to maintain arms.28 The Third Amendment
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art, II, § 2.
23 ROBERT W. COAKLEY, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES IN DOMESTIC DISORDER,
1789–1878, at 4–12 (1988); DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 140, 180–81 (1990).
24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. II, § 2. (granting Congress the power to review military
appropriations, the power to raise the standing army, the power to declare war, and
making the military subordinate to the President).
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; id. art. IV, § 4.
26 See THE FEDERALIST No. 8, at 122–23 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 296 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1961).
27 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1972).
28 U.S. CONST. amend. II; see also Laird, 408 U.S. at 22–23.
21
22
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addressed the very concerns that inflamed Boston residents at the
time of the Boston Massacre, prohibiting the housing of federal troops
in citizens’ homes against their wishes.29 These restrictions directly addressed the serious concerns Americans had about the misuse of the
British Army before American independence. The amendments
assuaged some of the concerns about using the military domestically,
because the early Congress often used the military to enforce federal
law.30
After the Constitution was ratified, Congress assembled and began
exercising its legislative authority and began to permit the domestic
use of the military. First, Congress authorized the President to call the
militia to protect the frontier from “hostile incursions of the Indians.”31
Next, Congress enabled the militias to respond to invasion, insurrection, and obstruction of the laws.32 These acts permitted the President
to call forth the militia for a limited time, when “the laws of the United
States shall be opposed, or the execution thereof obstructed . . .”33 The
President had authority to act only after he issued a proclamation
commanding the “insurgents” to disperse.34
iv. The Use of the Military by the Founding Fathers
President George Washington first used this “calling forth” authority
to suppress the Whiskey Rebellion in Western Pennsylvania, an insurrection that rebelled against federal government taxes on the
production of whiskey.35 In activating the state militia to suppress the
U.S. CONST. amend. III; see also Laird, 408 U.S. at 22–23.
See Calling Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, § 2, 1 Stat. 264 (repealed 1795) (granting the
President authority to use state militias to defend against domestic threats).
31 Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 10, 1. Stat. 96; Id. § 16, 1 Stat. 119, 121 (repealed 1795)
(regulating the military establishment of the United States).
32 Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424 (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–35 (2000));
Calling Forth Act of 1792.
33 Calling Forth Act of 1792 § 2.
34 Id. § 3.
35 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 1411 (1794) (Gales and Seaton 1855) (proclamation of
President Washington, Aug. 7, 1794); id. 1413 (proclamation of President Washington,
Sept. 25, 1794) (discussing the implications of the proclamations and their use during
the Whiskey Rebellion); STEVEN R. BOYD, THE WHISKEY REBELLION: PAST AND PRESENT
PERSPECTIVES 123 (1985); 5 JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES
29
30
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insurrection, Congress and the President understood that the military
was there only to assist civilian power in enforcing the law, not to supplant local authority.36 The civilian federal law enforcement and the
civilian federal courts maintained primary authority to enforce the tax
and prosecute offenders.
The Founding Fathers who ratified the new Constitution continued
to use the military inside the United States without significant objection.37 Each use was in support of the civilian authorities and
sometimes directly supported law enforcement. The military was
used by President John Adams to suppress the 1799 Fries Rebellion
with little objection.38 The military arrested the leader, John Fries, and
other conspirators, and turned them over to civil authorities for prosecution.39 President Thomas Jefferson called out federal troops to
enforce the Embargo Act, a tax opposed by Vermont traders.40
Congress ratified the action by amending the Embargo Act to permit
the use of federal troops to enforce it.41
In each of these instances, there was general support for using the
military to enforce domestic law. However, each instance involved the
President calling forth the military only with the approval of
Congress. The military acted to enforce civilian law, but did so in support of the civilian law enforcement, and did not supplant or usurp
civilian authority. Therefore, the early leaders of America both understood the dangers posed by using the military as a domestic enforcer

PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 158–62 (1896); THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY
REBELLION: FRONTIER EPILOGUE TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 165, 196–97 (1986).
36 See Engdahl, supra note 5, at 49–50 (explaining the doctrinal role of military troops in
assisting in the enforcement of civilian law).
37 See generally FREDERICK T. WILSON, FEDERAL AID IN DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES, 1787–
1903, S. Doc. No. 57-209, at 38, 51, 57 (1903) (providing an overview of the use of federal
troops in providing aid during domestic disturbances from 1787 to 1922 and specific
instances of use by several early presidents).
38 RICH, supra note 9, at 21, 25–26.
39 President John Adams, Proclamation of March 12, 1799, reprinted in WILSON, supra
note 37, at 43.
40 Embargo Act of 1807, ch. 5, 2 Stat. 451 (repealed 1809) (calling for an embargo on all
ships and vessels in the ports and harbors of the United States).
41 Act of Dec. 22, 1807, ch. 5, 2 Stat. 506, 510 (repealed 1809) (authorizing the use of
federal troops in enforcement of the Embargo Act).
AND
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of the law, and the need to still use the military on occasion to enforce
domestic law.
Prior to the Civil War, the federal government used the military
domestically for other purposes. The military was called upon to prevent U.S. flagged vessels from violating U.S. neutrality in European
wars,42 to detain and seize illegally armed vessels preparing to fight
in foreign wars,43 to defeat the conspiracy of Aaron Burr,44 and for
other purposes.45 Each of these involved the use of the military to enforce civil law, but the military was enforcing laws that seem to fit
comfortably in the military’s primary mission to defend the nation.
There was little concern about the use of the military in these
circumstances.
Concerns about using the military domestically increased dramatically before and after the Civil War, when civilian authorities began
to use the military as a posse comitatus46 and in other ways to enforce
civil law that was not related to the military’s primary purpose. The
military—or to be more specific—the Union Army, began to play a
greater role in the enforcement of the law, and often against the will
of the local population. The tensions at the founding of America
regarding the use of the military to enforce laws returned.

See generally Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381 (repealed 1818) (prohibiting U.S.
citizens from joining in or supporting military activities of foreign states); CHARLES G.
FENWICK, THE NEUTRALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 15–18 (1913) (describing early
neutrality statutes and the U.S. position on avoiding entanglements in foreign wars).
43 Act of June 5, 1794, § 7, 1 Stat. 381, 384.
44 President Thomas Jefferson, Message to Congress on the Burr Conspiracy (Jan. 22,
1807), in AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid
=65721; see also WILSON, supra note 37, at 48.
45 See Proclamation No. 194, 16 Stat. 1136 (Oct. 12, 1870) (prohibiting citizens of the
United States from engaging in military enterprises against countries with whom the
United States is at peace); FENWICK, supra, note 42, at 15–18 (proposing to stop U.S. aid
to Canadian rebels); RICHARDSON, supra note 35, at 7–8 (discussing actions taken to stop
an expedition preparing to attack Cuba); WILSON, supra note 37, at 51–53 (discussing
U.S. actions to halt militant activity on the Canadian border).
46 Posse comitatus is discussed in detail in the next section. It generally refers to the power
of a law enforcement officer to compel the assistance of citizens to help the officer
enforce the law. See infra Section II.B.i.
42
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B. Posse Comitatus, the Civil War and
Reconstruction
The domestic use of the military began to change in the decades prior
to the Civil War. While the Founding Fathers approved the use of the
military domestically for law enforcement activities like enforcing
neutrality and suppressing riots that oppose the taxation systems, the
early history predominately involved the President or Congress directing the military to act.47 On some occasions, like the Whiskey Rebellion, the President actually led the soldiers in the domestic
operation.48 As the Civil War grew closer, the decision to use the military for law enforcement was delegated to lower and lower levels of
government. Federal and state officials in local communities began to
call soldiers to assist local law enforcement under a common-law
doctrine called posse comitatus.49
i. Posse Comitatus
Common law authorized county sheriffs to require able-bodied men
to assist them in arresting fugitives and in performing other law enforcement activities.50 Prior to American independence, state and
county law enforcement officials in the Colonies continued to exert
this British common-law authority.51 When Congress created federal
marshals, the federal equivalent of a county sheriff, Congress granted

See RICH, supra note 9, at 21, 25–26; SLAUGHTER, supra note 35, 165, 196–97 (1986);
Engdahl, supra note 5, at 49–50 (explaining the doctrinal role of military troops in
assisting in the enforcement of civilian law).
48 HENRY M. BRACKENRIDGE, HISTORY OF THE WESTERN INSURRECTION IN WESTERN
PENNSYLVANIA, COMMONLY CALLED THE WHISKEY INSURRECTION (1859); WILLIAM
FINDLEY, HISTORY OF THE INSURRECTION IN THE FOUR WESTERN COUNTIES OF
PENNSYLVANIA 195 (1796); WILSON, supra note 37, at 32–34 (discussing U.S. actions to
halt militant activity on the Canadian border).
49 See Felicetti & Luce, supra note 4, at 95–96 (discussing the lack of an explicit limit on
the ability of local governments to call upon soldiers for law enforcement).
50 See id.
51 See United States v. Hart, 545 F. Supp. 470, 472 (D.N.D. 1982) (holding that common
law permits a sheriff to organize a posse); see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 817 (George Sharswood ed., 1893) (stating that a sheriff has
posse comitatus power to require citizens to assist in the arrest of felons).
47
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them this common-law authority of posse comitatus.52 As a result,
there were federal law enforcement officers in every federal district
who could require all local citizens to assist them in enforcing federal
law. This authority to call upon private citizens to form a posse was
without controversy. However, the controversy returned when marshals and sheriffs began to use this authority to require not just
civilians, but also federal troops and state militias, to assist in
enforcing federal law.53
As the practice of using the military to support law enforcement
grew, Congress began to legislate the use of the posse comitatus to
enforce the law.54 The Fugitive Slave Act was one such law.55 Pursuant
to the act, owners of escaped slaves were entitled to an arrest warrant
for the slave.56 Federal marshals were required to execute these warrants, and the marshal could require the assistance of “all good citizens” in the county.57 The act did not specifically state that the marshal
could require the assistance of soldiers, but it also did not prohibit the
use of the military to assist civilian police.58 After fierce opposition to
the law occurred in Boston and elsewhere, the President issued a proclamation requiring the military to assist federal marshals who were
executing federal warrants for former slaves who had fled to a state
that prohibited slavery.59 The Secretary of War affirmed this proclamation with an order to federal troops to assist marshals if needed.60

See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 27, 1 Stat. 73, 87 (granting marshals the authority to
appoint deputies and command assistance); see also Calling Forth Act, ch. 28, § 9, 1 Stat.
264, 265 (1792) (repealed 1795) (stating that marshals have same powers under federal
law as sheriffs have under state law).
53 See CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 1757 (1856) (proposing legislation and
discussion by Congress of local authorities to use the military as a posse comitatus).
54 See Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, § 5, 9 Stat. 462, 463 (repealed 1864).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 See id. at 462–63.
59 Proclamation of Feb. 18, 1851, 9 Stat. 1006 (President Millard Fillmore’s proclamation
requiring the military to assist with enforcement of the act); WILSON, supra note 37, at
62.
60 WILSON, supra note 37, at 62.
52
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Even the Senate Judiciary Committee agreed that federal marshals
could use the military as a posse comitatus.61
The U.S. Attorney General concurred in the use of the military to
enforce federal, state, and local law. Attorney General Caleb Cushing
issued an opinion stating that soldiers stationed in a county were part
of the posse comitatus and were required to assist law enforcement.62
Armed with the concurrence of the President, Congress, the Secretary
of War, and the Attorney General, law enforcement began robust use
of the military to enforce the law, especially laws that were unpopular
with the local community.63 The military chain of command could be
relied on to enforce unpopular laws even when local police officers
might use their discretion and decline to enforce unpopular criminal
laws in their jurisdiction. This expanded use of the military to enforce
unpopular laws appeared to be partisan—used by one political party
to enforce laws unpopular with an opposing party.64 Since the military
was not supposed to favor one political party over another, this use of
the military appeared inappropriate.65 The use, or misuse, of the military to enforce civilian law heightened during, and after, the Civil
War.
ii. Posse Comitatus and the Civil War
The exigencies brought on by the Civil War led to an expansion of the
use of the military to enforce civil law.66 In 1861, Congress authorized
the President to use the state militias or federal army when it was not
practicable to enforce the law through civilian law enforcement.67
Before the Civil War, the military could be used as a posse comitatus,
or otherwise to enforce the law, only if they remained subordinate to

COAKLEY, supra note 23, at 130; S. REP. NO. 31-320 (1851).
6 Op. Att’y Gen. 466, 473 (1854); see also COAKLEY, supra note 23, at 133–37.
63 RICHARDSON, supra note 35, at 358; see also 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 516, 522 (1860).
64 See supra note 53, at 1813 (1856) (proposed legislation and discussion by Congress
disapproving of the use of the military in Kansas as a posse comitatus).
65 Id.
66 See Kealy, supra note 1, at 393.
67 Act of July 29, 1861, ch. 25, § 8, 12 Stat. 281.
61
62
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civil authority.68 As the Civil War developed, the military began to assert authority to enforce law without deference to civil law enforcement. As the Union Army began to win battles and secure land in
secessionist states, it began to reassert the law of the union and engage
in all areas of law enforcement.
iii. Posse Comitatus and Reconstruction
After the war ended, the Union Army took control of the government
of some of the defeated Southern states.69 Under their own direction,
the military kept public order, enforced taxes on whiskey production,
arrested members of the Klu Klux Klan, and guarded polling places.70
The military even seized several state legislatures and became
involved in local political matters and resolved local disputes between
whites and former slaves.71 The most controversial use of the military
was to protect polling stations in the highly disputed election between
Samuel J. Tilden and Rutherford B. Hayes.72
Hayes won very close elections in South Carolina, Louisiana, and
Florida.73 In those same states, President Ulysses Grant ordered the
Union Army to assist federal marshals in protecting the polling stations.74 Some argued the military’s assistance and presence at the polls
helped sway the election in these states, and the overall presidency to
Hayes.75 A dispute over who won the election ensued.76 Ultimately,

9 Op. Att’y Gen. 516, 522 (1860).
Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (creating the military districts to
govern defeated states).
70 James P. O’Shaugnhessy, Note, The Posse Comitatus Act: Reconstruction Politics
Reconsidered, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 703, 704–10 (1976).
71 Kealy, supra note 1, at 393.
72 See 5 CONG. REC. 2117 (1877) (remarks of Rep. Banning claiming that soldiers did the
Hayes campaign’s “dirty work”).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See JEFFREY ROGERS HUMMEL, EMANCIPATING SLAVES, ENSLAVING FREE MEN: A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 321 (1996) (arguing that the Army preferred
Hayes and therefore helped sway the election); see also H.W.C. Furman, Restrictions
Upon the Use of the Army Imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act, 27 MIL. L. REV. 85, 94 (1960).
76 HUMMEL, supra note 75, at 321.
68
69
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Congress resolved the disputed election, and Hayes secured the presidency the day before Inauguration Day.77 As a concession to his
opponents, President Hayes agreed to withdraw troops from the
South, and he signed a law criminalizing the use of the Army as a
posse comitatus.78 Congress and the President then began a process to
restrict the use of the military in domestic affairs, especially domestic
law enforcement at the order of local officials.
C. Restoring Limits on the Military by
Criminalizing Posse Comitatus
During Reconstruction, southern legislators objected to the intrusive
and prolonged use of the military for domestic law enforcement. The
military had far exceeded its historic domestic responsibilities. Local
officials, not the President, had the ability to require the military to
assist in enforcing domestic law at the local level. This local military
intrusion into criminal-law enforcement went beyond the expectations and desires of Americans, and in 1878, Congress passed the
Posse Comitatus Act to restore the limitations on the ability of local
officials to the military to arrest offenders and enforce the law.79
The Posse Comitatus Act passed with little fanfare in an appropriations bill in 1878.80 The current version of the statute reads:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of
the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute
the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both.81

Kealy, supra note 1, at 394.
HUMMEL, supra note 75, at 321; Kealy, supra note 1, at 394.
79 See Posse Comitatus Act, §15, 20 Stat. 152 (1878) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
1385 (2016)).
80 See id.
81 See 18 U.S.C. § 1385. The early version was substantially similar, but it was later
amended to include the Air Force after it was separated from the Army and became its
own branch of the Armed Forces. Presumably, Congress initially excluded the Navy
and the Marine Corps because they did not pose the same risk of domestic law
enforcement as the Army. Later, Congress passed a separate law requiring the
77
78
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The law clearly prohibits federal marshals and county sheriffs from
calling military units into service as a posse comitatus.82 It also prohibits
the use of the Army to “execute the laws,” implying a broader scope
to the prohibition.83 The act is also a criminal statute—violation of
which is a felony.84 However, there are no reported convictions of soldiers, airmen, or anyone else for violating the act.85 Despite this,
numerous state and federal courts have issued opinions on the act.86
These cases routinely involve a defendant who is trying to suppress
evidence in his criminal prosecution because the military’s involvement violated the Posse Comitatus Act.87 The court decisions create
differing and inconsistent rulings on what constitutes a Posse Comitatus Act violation and what the consequence of that violation should
be.88 Reviewing these cases demonstrate that the military still acts as
a posse comitatus and/or is used to execute the laws in violation of the
Posse Comitatus Act, even though no one is prosecuted.89
There is a reason why there have been repeated violations of the
Posse Comitatus Act but no prosecutions. A tension still exists
Department of Defense to issue regulations restricting the Navy and the Marine Corps
from engaging in improper domestic law enforcement. See 10 U.S.C. § 375 (2011).
82 See WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 867 (2d ed. 1920).
83 See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2016).
84 See id.
85 Furman, supra note 75, at 94 (discussing reports that, in 1879, two Army officers were
indicted in Texas for providing U.S. marshals with troops to enforce revenue laws, but
there is no record that they were convicted); see also G. NORMAN LIEBER, OFFICE OF THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE, U.S. WAR DEP’T, DOC. NO. 64, THE USE OF THE ARMY IN AID OF THE
CIVIL POWER 28 n.1 (1898); Matthew Carlton Hammond, Note, The Posse Comitatus Act:
A Principle in Need of Renewal, 75 Wash. U. L.Q. 953, 961 (1997).
86 See Hammond, supra note 85, at 953, 961, 965–67.
87 See Casper v. United States, 430 U.S. 970 (1977); United States v. Dreyer, 804 F.3d 1266
(9th Cir. 2015) (en banc); United States v. Red Feather, 541 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916 (D.S.D. 1975), aff’d, 541 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir.
1976); People v. Burden, 288 N.W.2d 392 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (applying the
exclusionary rule to a drug investigation in which a member of the U.S. Air Force
participated with the approval of his commander), rev'd, 303 N.W.2d 444 (Mich. 1981);
Taylor v. State, 645 P.2d 522 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (applying the exclusionary rule for
a Posse Comitatus Act violation as a result of a military police officer’s active
participation in a search and arrest); United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186
(D.N.D. 1975); United States v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Neb. 1974).
88 See Hammond, supra note 85, at 953, 961, 965–67.
89 See Burden, 288 N.W.2d at 392, rev'd, 303 N.W.2d 444; Taylor, 645 P.2d at 522.
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between the need to call on the military to assist the civilian population during emergencies, and the traditional American reluctance to
having the military enforce the civil law. Some scholars argue the
Posse Comitatus Act embodies a larger principle of American concern
of a standing army that may restrict individual liberties, but the failure
to prosecute violations also hints at a desire to continue to have access
to the military when dire circumstances arise.90 Put another way, a
court is willing to acknowledge when the military acts beyond its legal
mandate, but may find it extremely difficult to convict an Army officer
for using his soldiers in a time of crisis to assist civilian authorities.
The Posse Comitatus Act highlights a clear struggle in the American psyche between what Americans want the law to say and what
Americans want the military to do in times of crisis. There is an
equally compelling struggle right now over the Fourth Amendment’s
restrictions on police conduct and the application of the exclusionary
rule.

III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE

At the same time the Founding Fathers crafted restrictions on the use
of the military inside the United States, they also created protections
for citizens from overreaching law enforcement activity.91 The military
restrictions were incorporated into the Constitution, and additional
restrictions were added in the Second and Third Amendments to the
Constitution.92 The restrictions on law enforcement were passed with
even greater prominence, being both incorporated in the body of the
Cf. Felicetti & Luce, supra note 4, at 91 (arguing that there is “a broader policy or ‘spirit’
behind the [Posse Comitatus] Act”).
91 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III; id. amends. IV, V, VI, VIII.
92 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (giving Congress appropriations powers over the
military, the power to raise a standing army and the power to declare war); id. art. II, §
2 (making the military subordinate to the civilian authority of the President); id. amend.
II (creating the right to a militia under state control and the right of citizens to keep
arms); id. amend. III (prohibiting the federal government from housing troops in
citizens’ homes without the consent of the owner); see also Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1,
22–23 (discussing these constitutional rights). There are other restrictions as well, but
these are provided as illustration of some key restrictions.
90
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Constitution and added into the Fourth, Fifth, Six, and Eighth Amendments.93 Similar to the military restrictions mentioned in the previous
section, these restrictions were included to address specific abuses by
the British government against the Colonies.94 These blanket
restrictions and prohibitions on government conduct created clear
individual rights but, with one notable exception, they failed to establish the appropriate remedy, should the government or its agents violate those rights.95 Over the course of American jurisprudence, courts
formulated a doctrine of exclusion, that evidence obtained in violation
of constitutional rights should be excluded from the government’s
efforts to prosecute citizens.96 This judicial doctrine of excluding evidence obtained by the government in violation of the law was created
with the Fourth Amendment.97
A. Creation and Growth of the
Exclusionary Rule
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable government searches and seizures, but it does not explain what remedies are
available for a violation of this constitutional right.98 The Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution reads:

See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III (creating an independent judiciary and giving Congress
the ability to create inferior courts that can examine police conduct); id. amend. IV
(requiring law enforcement to obtain search warrants and refrain from unreasonable
searches); id. amend. V (creating a litany of essential rights like due process, the
privilege against self-incrimination, the right to indictment by a grand jury and others);
id. amend. VI (granting the right to speedy trial, right to a jury, right to confrontation of
witnesses and right to assistance of counsel); id. amend. VIII (prohibiting cruel and
unusual punishment, and excessive bail).
94 1 HOMER C. HOCKETT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1776–
1826, at 74 (1939); JACOB LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 19 (1966).
95 U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing a remedy by prohibiting self-incrimination).
96 See generally David Gray, A Spectacular Non Sequitur: The Supreme Court’s Contemporary
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2013).
97 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Gray, supra note 96; Christine M. D’Elia, Comment, The
Exclusionary Rule: Who Does It Punish?, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 563, 564–65 (1995).
98 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures and
requiring search warrants without proscribing a remedy for violations of these rights).
93
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.99

Nowhere in the language of this text is a suggestion that the remedy for a violation of the Fourth Amendment is the exclusion of evidence.100 For almost a century, the courts did not craft any remedy for
Fourth Amendment violations.101 In 1886, the Supreme Court finally
addressed the issue of remedies when it created the exclusionary rule
in a forfeiture case.102 In Boyd v. United States, the defendant was compelled to produce evidence showing the value and quantity of the
goods that were to be forfeited.103 The goods were ordered forfeited
and Boyd appealed, claiming the forced production of evidence was
a violation of the Fourth Amendment.104 The Supreme Court agreed
and, for the first time, determined that evidence obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment should be excluded from court proceedings.105 This judicial rule of exclusion was created by analogizing to
the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition of the introduction of compelled
testimony.106 Later courts have disagreed over whether the exclusionary rule is a protection required by the Constitution, or merely a
matter of judicial interpretation, or part of the court’s “supervisory
power.”107 Some courts argue that the exclusionary rule is “not a com-

Id.
Id.; see also D’Elia, supra note 97, at 563.
101 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (excluding evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment).
102 Id. at 638; see also Richard A. Epstein, Entick v Carrington and Boyd v United States:
Keeping the Fourth and Fifth Amendments on Track, 82 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 27 (2015).
103 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 638.
104 Id. at 618.
105 Id. at 638.
106 U.S. CONST. amend. V (mandating that no person may be compelled “in a criminal
case to be a witness against himself”); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633–34.
107 See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 50 (1992) (suggesting the exclusionary rule
is part of Court’s supervisory powers); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 1.1(d) (5th ed. 2015).
99

100
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mand of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evidence which Congress may negate.”108 Others disagree, stating that
when read in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment, “a constitutional basis emerges which not only justifies but actually requires the
exclusionary rule.”109
This “exclusionary rule” was methodically expanded to encompass more and more Fourth Amendment violations.110 In Weeks v.
United States, the Supreme Court excluded evidence seized from an
illegal search of the defendant’s home.111 In Mapp v. Ohio, the Supreme
Court applied the exclusionary rule to state courts for state searches
that violated the Fourth Amendment.112 These cases and others created the foundation of the exclusionary rule, but they only hinted at
the overall purpose of excluding competent evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.113
As courts began to expand the exclusionary rule, they also began
to question when it is appropriate to exclude competent evidence of
guilt because of inappropriate actions of government officials. Courts
have struggled with the fundamental question of whether the exclusionary rule is required by the Constitution, whether it is appropriate
for statutory or regulatory violations, and whether a court must
determine that excluding evidence satisfies the fundamental purpose
of the exclusionary rule.
B. Identifying the Purpose of the
Exclusionary Rule
Many judicial opinions exclude evidence when the courts can connect
the exclusion to the purpose of the exclusionary rule. A major purpose

Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28, 32–33 (1949).
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 662 (1961) (Black, J., concurring); see also TRACEY MACLIN,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S EXCLUSIONARY RULE, 88–110,
121–124 (2013).
110 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (applying the exclusionary rule to
evidence seized from an illegal search); Wolf, 338 U.S. at 25.
111 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 662; see also MACLIN, supra note 109, at 8–14, 17–24.
112 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656–57.
113 LAFAVE, supra note 107, at § 1.1(f) (stating that Weeks and Boyd suggest that deterrence
is the purpose of the exclusionary rule).
108
109
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of the exclusionary rule throughout its history has been to deter law
enforcement from engaging in unlawful behavior.114 The exclusionary
rule has been justified by its “deterrent safeguard,”115 that its “purpose
is to deter,”116 and that it is an “effective deterrent to police action.”117
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the “major thrust” of the exclusionary rule is deterrence, but courts have also noted additional
purposes for the rule that may justify excluding evidence.118 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has justified excluding evidence for
purposes other than deterrence as well.
The Supreme Court has stated other purposes for the exclusionary
rule. One Supreme Court case noted that the “imperative of judicial
integrity” requires courts to exclude evidence obtained in an unconstitutional manner.119 Another possible purpose is to restore or
maintain trust in the government, by ensuring the government does
not profit from its unlawful behavior.120 Another purpose could be to
apply the exclusionary rule only where there have been massive institutional failures, at times when law enforcement has pervasive and
widespread practice of violating basic constitutional protections.121

Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 210–20 (1960); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968);
see also LAFAVE, supra note 107, at § 1.1(f).
115 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648–51.
116 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217.
117 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636–37 (1965).
118 Terry, 392 U.S. at 12–15; see also LAFAVE supra note 111, at 1.1(f).
119 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 206; see also Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin, “A More Majestic
Conception”: The Importance of Judicial Integrity in Preserving the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 47, 48 (2010) (“judicial integrity” is the primary purpose of exclusionary
rule); Michael D. Cicchini, An Economics Perspective on the Exclusionary Rule and
Deterrence, 75 MO. L. REV. 459, 461 (2010) (asserting that the exclusionary rule serves the
integrity of the judiciary); Andrew E. Taslitz, Hypocrisy, Corruption, and Illegitimacy: Why
Judicial Integrity Justifies the Exclusionary Rule, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 419, 474 (2013)
(stating that the exclusionary rule serves judicial integrity).
120 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Scott
E. Sundby, Everyman’s Exclusionary Rule: The Exclusionary Rule and the Rule of Law (or
Why Conservatives Should Embrace the Exclusionary Rule), 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 393, 397–
98 (2013) (arguing that the rule of law and the ordinary citizen’s belief in it is a
justification for the exclusionary rule). This concept rests on the idea that the trust of
citizens in the U.S. government will be increased when the citizens know the
government cannot benefit from unconstitutional activity. Id.
121 See John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1050 (1974).
114
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Academics have argued for other justifications for the exclusionary
rule.122 Understanding the purpose of the exclusionary rule is essential
to determining when the court should suppress evidence and when it
should not.
Although other purposes behind the exclusionary rule have been
cited, the Supreme Court has for decades focused on the primary purpose of deterring future police misconduct as the basis for
suppressing evidence.123 In recent years, the Supreme Court has emphasized the deterrence purpose of the exclusionary rule over all
other possible purposes.124 In Herring v. United States, the majority and
dissenting opinions demonstrate a stark contrast in the debate over
the purpose of the exclusionary rule, and the effect it has on the application of the exclusionary rule to the facts of each case.125 The defendant was arrested and his truck was searched based on inaccurate
information from the police department of a different county.126
During the search, and based on the mistaken belief that there was a
warrant, the officers found a firearm and methamphetamine.127 The
defendant was charged with drug and firearm offenses, and he moved
to suppress the evidence against him.128 The parties before the
Supreme Court agreed that the search was unlawful, but the government argued that the exclusionary rule should not apply because the
mistake was the result of a bookkeeping error, and therefore
suppression would have no deterrent effect.129

See, e.g., William A. Schroeder, Restoring the Status Quo Ante: The Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule as a Compensating Device, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633, 636 (1983).
123 See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897 (1984); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433
(1976).
124 See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011). See generally Scott E. Sundby and
Lucy B. Ricca, The Majestic and the Mundane: The Two Creation Stories of the Exclusionary
Rule, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 391 (2010).
125 See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 n.2 (2009) (majority opinion); id. at 151–
53 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
126 Id. at 137–38.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 138.
129 Id. at 137.
122
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The five-justice majority found that deterrence is the “purpose” of
the exclusionary rule.130 The Supreme Court held that the exclusionary
rule “forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence at trial.”131 Since
the Fourth Amendment violation was a mistake, there was no
deterrent effect in suppressing the evidence against Herring.132 The
majority emphasized that the only legitimate purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterrence.133 If suppressing evidence will not deter
future police misconduct, then suppression of improperly obtained
evidence is not appropriate.
The dissent argued that the evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment should be suppressed because of other important
purposes behind the exclusionary rule.134 Although the dissent concurs that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterrence,
the dissent argues that the need to preserve judicial integrity and
ensure that the government does not profit from its wrongdoing is
also an essential “purpose” of the exclusionary rule.135 The Herring
majority disagreed with this concept of multiple purposes for the exclusionary rule, and the Supreme Court began to restrict the reach of
the exclusionary rule to only those cases in which it would have a
deterrent effect on future police behavior.136
In Davis v. United States, the Supreme Court affirmed the Herring
view that that deterrence is the only legitimate purpose of the exclusionary rule, stating:137

Id. at 139-40 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
Id. (“We have stated that this judicially created rule is designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect.”)
132 Id. at 140 (connecting the officers’ mistaken belief that a warrant existed to the Fourth
Amendment and the court’s holding of the deterrence purpose).
133 Id.; see also Sundby & Ricca, supra note 124, at 392–93 (asserting prime intention of
exclusionary rule through analysis of landmark exclusionary cases).
134 See Herring, 555 U.S. at 151–52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Stevens’s
dissent in Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 18 (1995)).
135 See id. (quoting Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins,
Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L.
Rev. 1365, 1389 (1983)).
136 See id.
137 See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236 (2011).
130
131
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[i]t is one thing for the criminal “to go free because the constable has
blundered.” It is quite another to set the criminal free because the constable has scrupulously adhered to governing law. Excluding evidence
in such cases deters no police misconduct and imposes substantial
social costs.138

The Court explained that “real deterrent value is a ‘necessary
condition for exclusion,’” and excluding evidence is inappropriate if
it would not deter future police conduct.139 The majority rejected the
idea that there were other legitimate purposes to suppress evidence.140
The Davis Court also emphasized that the exclusionary rule is not
required by the Constitution, but is “is a ‘prudential’ doctrine, created
by this Court to ‘compel respect for the constitutional guaranty.’”141
As a judicially created rule, the Court stressed it must be narrowly
applied only when necessary to satisfy its sole purpose of
deterrence.142
The dissent in Davis vigorously criticized the majority opinion.143
While the dissent argued about retroactivity and the applicability of
new constitutional rules to pending cases, its main disagreement with
the majority concerned the “purpose” of the exclusionary rule.144 The
dissent argued that the majority opinion “will undermine the exclusionary rule” and limit its reach to only those cases where it will deter
future police misconduct.145
This recent emphasis on the application of the exclusionary rule to
only Fourth Amendment violations that will deter future police conduct is a significant reduction in the application and effect of the exclusionary rule. Prior to this restriction, the exclusionary rule was

Id. at 249 (quoting People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (Cardozo,
J.)).
139 Id. at 237 (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596 (2006)).
140 Id.
141 See id. at 236 (explaining that the text of the Fourth Amendment lacks reference to
the suppression of any evidence obtained through its violation) (quoting Pennsylvania
Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998), and Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
142 Id. at 236–37 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1965)).
143 See id. at 252 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
144 See id. at 256–57.
145 See id. at 257–60.
138
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applied to non-constitutional violations of law.146 This renewed focus
on excluding evidence that was derived from only constitutional
violations will impact a significant portion of exclusionary-rule
jurisprudence.
C. Applying the Exclusionary Rule Beyond
Fourth Amendment Violations
The Supreme Court has now emphasized the specific purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter future police misconduct by suppressing
evidence obtained in unconstitutional searches and seizures, which is
a departure from past case law.147 Historically, the exclusionary rule
was used in cases that did not involve constitutional violations.148 In
those cases, courts suppressed evidence obtained by the government
in violation of statutes, regulations, and other non-constitutional violations.149 The recent Supreme Court jurisprudence in Herring and
Davis has significantly limited the exclusionary rule’s application in
non-constitutional violations of law.150 This new line of cases limiting
the application of the exclusionary rule conflicts with the cases that
address Posse Comitatus Act violations.
The Supreme Court and other federal courts have emphasized that
violating government regulations is insufficient to trigger the exclusionary rule.151 In United States v. Caceres, the Supreme Court held that
suppression of tape recordings was not appropriate when the
recordings were obtained in compliance with the Fourth Amendment
but in violation of Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) regulations.152
See, e.g., Sanchez–Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 348 (2006); Miller v. United States,
357 U.S. 301, 313–14 (1958); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 344–45, (1943)
(stating that the exclusionary rule requires notice and is used to avoid illegal
interrogations that lead to unreliable confessions).
147 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009).
148 See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 749–50 (1979).
149 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 416–428 (1974). See generally Carl McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L.
REV. 659 (1972).
150 Davis, 564 U.S. at 236–38.
151 Caceres, 440 U.S. at 754–56; see also Recent Case, United States v. Dreyer, 767 F.3d 826
(9th Cir. 2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 1876, 1880–81 (2015).
152 Caceres, 440 U.S. at 756–57.
146
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Caceres was decided three decades before the Supreme Court started
limiting the application and purpose of the exclusionary rule.153 In
Caceres, the Court rejected the application of the exclusionary rule to
agency regulations, noting that “rigid application of an exclusionary
rule to every regulatory violation could have a serious deterrent impact on the formulation of additional standards to govern prosecutorial and police procedures.”154 While the Supreme Court stopped short
of declaring that exclusion of evidence is never appropriate for nonconstitutional regulatory violations, circuit courts of appeals have
more forcefully argued the inapplicability of the exclusionary rule to
regulatory violations.155
In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, the Supreme Court determined that
the exclusionary rule should not be applied to violations of the right
to consular notifications under a treaty.156 The Court explained that
the exclusionary rule should be used primarily “to deter constitutional violations” and only used to suppress evidence for statutory
violations in rare cases where “the evidence arose out of statutory
violations that implicated important Fourth and Fifth Amendment interests.”157 The Court reaffirmed that the focus of the exclusionary rule
was to deter constitutional violations.
Circuit courts of appeals have followed the Supreme Court’s reluctance to apply the exclusionary rule to statutory and regulatory
violations.158 In United States v. Lomberga-Camorlinga, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals determined that the exclusionary rule should not be
used to suppress evidence in violation of a treaty.159 The treaty
required law enforcement officers to notify a foreign national that he

Id. at. 741; Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
Caceres, 440 U.S. at 755–56.
155 See United States v. Hinton, 222 F.3d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
156 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 348 (2006).
157 Id. at 348; see also Caceres, 440 U.S. at 754–57.
158 See Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 886; United States v. Adams, 740 F.3d 40, 43–44
(1st Cir. 2014); United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547. 556–57 (6th Cir. 2006).
159 Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 886.
153
154
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has a right to notify his consulate that he was arrested.160 Citing numerous other circuits, the Ninth Circuit en banc panel determined that
the “exclusionary rule is typically available only for constitutional
violations, not for statutory or treaty violations.”161
In United States v. Adams, the First Circuit concurred, finding that
the exclusionary rule should not apply to government violations of
statutes.162 The First Circuit found that “statutory violations, untethered to the abridgment of constitutional rights, are not sufficiently
egregious to justify suppression.”163 The Sixth Circuit agreed, stating
in United States v. Abdi, “the exclusionary rule is an appropriate sanction for a statutory violation only where the statute specifically
provides for suppression as a remedy or the statutory violation implicates underlying constitutional rights such as the right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure.”164 These courts have emphasized
that Congress alone should write the exclusionary rule into a statute,
and courts should not read into a statutory scheme an exclusionary
remedy when Congress has prescribed a remedy other than exclusion.165 These circuit courts stress that the exclusionary rule should be

Id.; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596
U.N.T.S. 261.
161 Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 886; see also United States v. Smith, 196 F.3d 1034,
1040 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The use of the exclusionary rule is an exceptional remedy typically
reserved for violations of constitutional rights.”); United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414,
424 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding a statutory violation insufficient to justify imposition of the
exclusionary rule, absent an underlying constitutional violation or right); United States
v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1289 n.5 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d
1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding a statutory violation insufficient to justify
imposition of the exclusionary rule, absent an underlying constitutional violation or
right or evidence that Congress intended exclusion as a remedy); United States v.
Benevento, 836 F.2d 60, 69 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Kington, 801 F.2d 733, 737
(5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 29 (1st Cir. 1983) (rejecting
suppression as a remedy for a treaty violation because the exclusionary rule “was not
fashioned to vindicate a broad, general right to be free of agency action not ‘authorized’
by law, but rather to protect certain specific, constitutionally protected rights of
individuals.”).
162 Adams, 740 F.3d at 43–44.
163 Id.
164 United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 556–57 (6th Cir. 2006).
165 See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 512–13 (9th Cir. 2008) (pen register
statute); United States v. Feng, 277 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2002) (prosecutor’s alleged
160
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limited to constitutional violations, and only be used for statutory
violations when authorized by Congress, or when the statute is so
closely connected to a constitutional right that the exclusionary rule is
needed to protect that right.
Suppression of evidence is also not appropriate for a violation of
agency regulations.166 In United States v. Hinton, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals categorically stated, “suppression is not the appropriate remedy for a failure to follow agency regulations.”167 Hinton—
another case decided prior to Herring and Davis—stressed that the
exclusionary rule was designed to apply to constitutional violations,
not regulatory ones.168 The court clearly stated that the “relevant
inquiry is whether a constitutional right, not an agency regulation, has
been violated.”169 Hinton and other circuit cases are entirely consistent
with the shift in the Supreme Court’s view of the purpose of the
exclusionary rule.170
The Supreme Court has also confirmed that the exclusionary rule
should only be applied when it deters police misconduct.171 The Court
and subsequent Ninth Circuit cases emphasize that the exclusionary
rule should only apply to conduct that violates the Constitution, not
to lesser violations of statutes or agency regulations.172 Despite this
long line of cases restricting the use of the exclusionary rule, courts
have considered applying it to the violation of the Posse Comitatus
Act, a statute, and to agency regulations that apply the statutory
proscriptions. These views on the purpose of the exclusionary rule are
at odds with the evolving views on the role of the military in domestic
law enforcement. Courts still consider applying the exclusionary rule

violation of criminal bribery statute); United States v. Michaelian, 803 F.2d 1042, 1049
(9th Cir. 1986) (unauthorized IRS disclosure of tax return information).
166 See United States v. Hinton, 222 F.3d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 2000).
167 Id.
168 Id. at 675.
169 Id.
170 Id.; see also United States v. Ani, 138 F.3d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding the
exclusionary rule was not applicable to a non-constitutional violation of U.S. Customs
regulation).
171 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141–43 (2009).
172 United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 755–56 (1979); Hinton, 222 F.3d at 674–75.
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to a criminal statute, and regulations implementing it, when the acts
concern the use of the military as law enforcement.

IV. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND
THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT

The Ninth Circuit’s application of the exclusionary rule to the Posse
Comitatus Act is inconsistent with evolving Supreme Court doctrine.
The Posse Comitatus Act is a criminal statute; the violation of it carries
a fine and prison for the actor.173 In 1878, Congress did not write in the
act that evidence derived in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act
should be excluded in a criminal trial, and it has not added one in the
140 years since its enactment.174 The Posse Comitatus Act applies to
the Navy and Marine Corps not by its language, but indirectly,
through congressionally mandated agency regulations.175 The exclusionary rule should not apply to Posse Comitatus Act violations
because a violation of the act is not a constitutional violation.
Although some courts have been reluctant to apply an exclusionary
rule to Posse Comitatus Act cases in the past, other courts have freely
applied it to evidence seized during a Posse Comitatus Act violation.
The current Supreme Court guidance is that the exclusionary rule
should only be used to suppress evidence derived from constitutional
violations, and only be used when it will likely deter future police
misconduct. Application of the exclusionary rule to Posse Comitatus
Act violations does not fit well into either purpose. This section will
explore the cases that have struggled to find the appropriate connection between the improper use of the military to assist in law
enforcement activities and the evidence obtained from that improper
use.

Posse Comitatus Act, §15, 20 Stat. 152 (1878) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1385
(2016)).
174 Id. Congress amended the statute only once, to include the Air Force after it was
separated from the Army pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947.
175 See 10 U.S.C. § 275 (2016) (renumbered from section 375); DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DOD
INSTRUCTION 3025.21, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
(Feb. 27, 2013).
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A. The Posse Comitatus Act and Wounded Knee
The Posse Comitatus Act was a little-used and relatively obscure
statute for almost a century, until it became prominent in the criminal
cases that resulted from an incident at Wounded Knee, South Dakota,
in 1973.176 A group protesting the treatment of Native Americans took
control of the small town of Wounded Knee.177 State and federal law
enforcement officers responded and issued orders prohibiting individuals from bypassing law enforcement roadblocks and entering the
town.178 The military also responded to provide assistance to law enforcement.179 Several individuals were arrested and prosecuted for
crimes including obstructing a law enforcement officer in the lawful
performance of his duties during the course of a civil disturbance.180
Four defendants, charged in separate cases raised a claim that the
military involvement with civilian law enforcement required an
acquittal.181 The defendants claimed that their convictions should be
overturned because the military’s assistance to law enforcement violated the Posse Comitatus Act.182 The defendants argued that an
essential element of the charged crime required that the law enforcement officers were lawfully engaged in their duties.183 Since law
enforcement called on the military in violation of federal law, the

United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186 (D.N.D. 1975); United States v. Red
Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916 (D.S.D. 1975); United States v. Banks, 383 F. Supp. 389 (D.S.D.
1974); United States v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Neb. 1974).
177 Cf. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. at 1376.
178 Andrew H. Malcolm, Occupation of Wounded Knee is Ended, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 1973),
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0508.
html.
179 Red Feather, 392 F.Supp. at 921.
180 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) (1970), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 231(1994). See Jaramillo, 380 F.
Supp. 1375; Banks, 383 F. Supp. 368; Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916; McArthur, 419 F. Supp.
186.
181 Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375; Banks, 383 F. Supp. 368; Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916;
McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186.
182 See Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375; Banks, 383 F. Supp. 368; Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916;
McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186.
183 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) (whoever obstructs a “law enforcement officer lawfully engaged
in the lawful performance of his official duties . . .”).
176
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defendants claimed, the military was not engaged in lawful duties and
the convictions should not stand.184
Separate courts reached different conclusions on whether the
military’s actions violated the Posse Comitatus Act.185 These cases did
not specifically discuss the exclusionary rule. Rather, the issue was
whether the government could prove an essential element of the crime
if the military violated the Posse Comitatus Act.186 However, the
Wounded Knee cases provided different and conflicting ways to evaluate whether the military acted in violation of the Posse Comitatus
Act, and opened the door for other defendants to argue that suppression of evidence is the appropriate remedy when the military
unlawfully engages in law enforcement activity.
B. Suppressing Evidence in Posse
Comitatus Act Violations
The Wounded Knee cases challenged the lawfulness of police conduct
when the military assists them in law enforcement activities. These
cases led to the next logical step: defendants requesting the suppression of evidence gathered by the military in violation of the Posse
Comitatus Act.187 While the Supreme Court has never ruled on a Posse
Comitatus case, the lower state and federal courts developed a consistent pattern. These cases arose long before the Supreme Court

Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. at 925; see also Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. at 1381 (upholding
acquittal on charge of obstructing law enforcement officers at Wounded Knee on
grounds that the prosecution failed to prove that the Posse Comitatus Act was not
violated by the military’s contributions to the operation, thus raising a reasonable doubt
as to whether the law enforcement officers were lawfully engaged in the performance
of duties). But see McArthur, 419 F. Supp. at 194 (holding that evidence of military
activity at Wounded Knee was insufficient to overcome presumption that law
enforcement officers acted in performance of duties).
185 See Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. at 1381 (holding that the military’s actions violated the
Posse Comitatus Act); Banks, 383 F. Supp. at 376 (stating that the military’s actions
violated the Posse Comitatus Act); Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. at 925 (stating that the
military’s supporting actions did not violate the Posse Comitatus Act).
186 See Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. at 1375; Banks, 383 F. Supp. at 368; Red Feather, 392 F. Supp.
at 916.
187 See United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1974); see also United States v.
Griley, 814 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1987).
184
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began narrowing the application of the exclusionary rule to its purpose to deter police misconduct, and the courts developed a common
response to requests to suppress evidence obtained by the military in
violation of the Posse Comitatus Act.
In the pre-Herring cases, courts noted that the Posse Comitatus Act
does not contain a provision calling for suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the act.188 Courts have noted that Congress has
the option to write the exclusionary rule into statutes, but chose
instead to use criminal sanctions to deter military misconduct.189 The
courts then note that lower courts could create an exclusionary rule
for violations of the Posse Comitatus Act, just as the Supreme Court
did for Fourth Amendment violations in Boyd.190 Each court then determined whether there existed “widespread and repeated violations”
of the Posse Comitatus Act that warranted judicial creation and
employment of the exclusionary rule.191
In United States v. Walden, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
noted that there was no statutory exclusionary rule for the Posse
Comitatus Act and declined to create one where the defendant alleged
that U.S. Marine Corps investigators obtained evidence in violation of
the Posse Comitatus Act.192 The Fourth Circuit reaffirmed this rule in
1995, when the court found that the exclusionary rule is not available

See, e.g., Griley, 814 F.2d at 976 (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to
violations of the Posse Comitatus Act, and finding no grounds to apply the exclusionary
rule based on the facts of the case).
189 See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2016) (criminalizing the use of the Army and Air Force to execute
the laws, and providing a two-year maximum sentence for violations).
190 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); see also Griley, 814 F.2d at 976.
191 Walden, 490 F.2d at 372 (acknowledging that the exclusionary rule could apply, but
declining to exclude evidence in that case); see also United States v. Dreyer, 804 F.3d
1266, 1278–79 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (stating exclusionary rule is available but declined
to apply it to the facts in that case); Griley, 814 F.2d at 976 (stating there is no
exclusionary rule for Posse Comitatus Act violations and no reason to adopt one in that
case); Taylor v. State, 645 P.2d 522 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (excluding evidence derived
from a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act).
192 Walden, 490 F.2d at 372; see also Griley, 814 F.2d at 967 (stating that there is no
exclusionary rule for Posse Comitatus Act violations and no reason to adopt one in that
case).
188
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for violations of the Posse Comitatus Act.193 The Al-Talib court emphasized that the exclusionary rule is clearly unavailable when the
military did not seize any evidence.194 The Fifth and Seventh Circuit
Courts of Appeals concurred in this view; both noted that the statute
lacks an exclusionary rule and both declined to create one when the
case before them did not involve widespread and repeated
violations.195
The Ninth Circuit also agreed.196 In dealing with allegations that
the U.S. Navy violated regulations that impose Posse Comitatus Actlike restrictions, the court determined “an exclusionary rule should
not be applied to violations [of regulations that apply the Posse Comitatus Act to the Navy] until a need to deter future violations is
demonstrated.”197
State courts also shared in this view. The Alaska appellate court
found there was no exclusionary rule applicable to Posse Comitatus
Act violations and no reason to create one without widespread or repeated violations.198 The Washington State Supreme Court went
further to state that there is no exclusionary rule for evidence obtained
in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act.199 Florida and Kansas have
also issued similar rulings, noting that there is no exclusionary rule in
the Posse Comitatus Act and declining to create a judicially imposed
exclusionary rule.200 Each of the state and federal courts who reviewed
potential Posse Comitatus Act violations declined to impose the exclusionary rule and suppress evidence derived from the alleged
violations. However, each court noted it could create an exclusionary
United States v. Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923 (1995).
Id.
195 United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Hartley, 796 F.2d
112 (5th Cir. 1986); Hayes v. Hawes, 921 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1990).
196 United States v. Roberts 779 F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir. 1986).
197 Id. at 568 (citing Wolffs, 594 F.2d at 77, 85, and Walden, 490 F.2d at 376–77).
198 Moon v. State, 785 P.2d 45 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990) (the court noted there was no
history of Posse Comitatus Act violations in Alaska).
199 State v. Valdobinos, 858 P.2d 199 (Wash. 1993).
200 See Taylor v. State, 640 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the
exclusionary rule should not be applied, although the Naval Investigative Service’s
involvement may have violated the Posse Comitatus Act); State v. Roberts, 786 P.2d 630
(Kan. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that even if a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act
occurred, the extraordinary remedy of exclusion is not appropriate).
193
194
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rule if the military engaged in “widespread and repeated violations”
of the Posse Comitatus Act or its implementing regulations.201
All of these cases preceded the Supreme Court’s recent exclusionary-rule restrictions.202 Although these cases noted the possibility of
creating an exclusionary rule for Posse Comitatus Act violations, each
court declined to suppress evidence in situations where the Posse
Comitatus Act was violated.203 Since courts were reluctant to apply the
exclusionary rule even before the Supreme Court’s recent declaration
that the exclusionary rule should only be used for constitutional violations, and only when it will deter future police misconduct, it
seemed likely that the exclusionary rule would never be applied to the
Posse Comitatus Act. Yet in United States v. Dreyer, the Ninth Circuit
took a different path.
C. The Dreyer Decision
The Ninth Circuit was the first appellate court to revisit the application of the exclusionary rule to the Posse Comitatus Act after the
Supreme Court decisions in Herring and Davis.204 In Dreyer, a Navy
Criminal Investigative Service (“NCIS”) agent used a software
program to search for child pornography on the internet.205 The NCIS
agent conducted a broad search of all computers in the state of
Washington, not just the computers of those in the military.206 The

See supra notes 199, 200; infra note and 202.
See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (finding that the exclusionary rule
is applicable “where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served”
(quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
203 See United States v. Dreyer, 804 F.3d 1266, 1279 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc); United States
v. Griley, 814 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply
to violations of the Posse Comitatus Act, and finding no grounds to apply the
exclusionary rule based on the facts of the case); State v. Roberts, 786 F.2d 630 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1990); Taylor, 640 So. 2d 1127.
204 Dreyer, 767 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 804 F.3d 1266.
205 Dreyer, 767 F.3d at 827, 830–31 (holding that although the agent was a civilian, the
Posse Comitatus Act restrictions applied to civilian officers working for the Navy (citing
United States v. Chon, 210 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2000))).
206 Id. at 827.
201
202
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software was only able to access information that was publicly
available, so the search complied with the Fourth Amendment.207
The NCIS agent found evidence of child pornography, determined
it belonged to someone outside of the military, and turned it over to
local law enforcement.208 The local officer obtained a search warrant
for the computer, found the child pornography, and Dreyer was
charged in federal court.209 Dreyer moved to suppress the evidence of
child pornography, claiming that the search conducted by the NCIS
agent violated the Posse Comitatus Act and that the exclusionary rule
should apply.210 The district court denied the motion, Dreyer was convicted at trial, and he appealed both his conviction and the denial of
the motion to suppress.211
The three-judge appellate panel found that the NCIS agent did
violate the regulations implementing the Posse Comitatus Act when
he conducted an internet search in the state of Washington for evidence of child pornography.212 The court then turned to the question
of whether the exclusionary rule should apply to suppress the
evidence gathered in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act.213 The
panel held that the evidence gathered in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act should be suppressed.214
The three-judge panel ignored the recent Supreme Court cases that
restricted the use of a judicially created exclusionary rule and instead
focused on an old Ninth Circuit precedent that contemplated creating
an exclusionary rule for the Posse Comitatus Act if there were “widespread and repeated violations.”215 The court emphasized that Posse
Comitatus Act violations of the NCIS agent were “widespread and
repeated,” therefore they believed that the evidence should be
excluded. The government appealed this decision and the Ninth
Circuit granted rehearing en banc.
See id.
Id. at 828.
209 Id. at 828–29.
210 Id. at 829.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 832.
213 Id. at 835–36.
214 Id. at 837.
215 Id. at 836 (citing United States v. Roberts, 779 F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir. 1986)).
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The en banc court affirmed the determination that the NCIS
violated the Posse Comitatus Act, but declined to suppress the evidence.216 However, the Ninth Circuit decision significantly departs
from Supreme Court precedence. The Ninth Circuit found that the
exclusionary rule was available, but declined to apply it to the facts in
this case.217 In doing so, the court misinterpreted Supreme Court precedent and inverted the test to determine when the exclusionary rule
should apply.218
The Dreyer court misinterprets Supreme Court precedent. Dreyer
acknowledged that the Supreme Court in Hudson v. Michigan began to
restrict the scope of the exclusionary rule.219 But the en banc court dismissed the cases that limited the exclusionary rule solely to violations
of constitutional rights.220 The Ninth Circuit argued that the Supreme
Court sanctions the use of the exclusionary rule to enforce some
statutes, although each case it cited as support were actually fiftyyear-old cases that had Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations.221
The court never cited Herring and mentioned Davis only in passing.222
Once the Ninth Circuit had softened Supreme Court precedent to
establish that the exclusionary rule may be applicable for statutory
violations, the court then turned to the issue of whether the exclusionary rule could be applied to Posse Comitatus Act violations.223 The
court determined it could because the Supreme Court had never
specifically ruled that the exclusionary rule did not apply to this statute, stating, “We know of no controlling precedent precluding application of the exclusionary rule for a violation of the [Posse Comitatus
Act or the regulations that apply it to the Navy].”224 The Ninth Circuit
ignored Sanchez-Llamas, which stated that the exclusionary rule

Dreyer, 804 F.3d 1266, 1279 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
Id. at 1279–80.
218 Id. at 1278–79.
219 Dreyer, 767 F.3d at 839 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)).
220 Dreyer, 804 F.3d at 1278–79.
221 Id. at 1278–79.
222 Id. at 1278.
223 Id. at 1279.
224 Id.
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should not be used for non-constitutional violations of statutes.225 The
Ninth Circuit stated the Posse Comitatus Act has “constitutional
underpinnings,” citing the Third Amendment and legislative
history.226 After diminishing Supreme Court precedent to allow exclusion of evidence for statutory violation not specifically precluded by
a Supreme Court opinion, it ultimately declined to apply the
exclusionary rule, but strongly stated that it would if there were future
violations by the military.227 Therefore, the highest court to address
this issue, and its most recent decision, holds that the exclusionary
rule is an available remedy for violations of the Posse Comitatus Act.

V. RECONCILING THE POSSE COMITATUS
ACT AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

The Dreyer decision conflicts with the recent line of Supreme Court
cases on the application of the exclusionary rule. The decision in
Dreyer is incorrect, but understandable. The Ninth Circuit was reacting to the same concerns that led to the passage of the Posse Comitatus
Act one and a half centuries ago. The military engaged in law enforcement activity, and did so at the direction at the local and low-level
civil officials. The facts demonstrated the military engaged in law
enforcement without regard for the traditional restrictions placed on
the military when enforcing the law. While the actions of the Navy
investigators were improper, using the exclusionary rule to suppress
evidence is contrary to Supreme Court precedent. The exclusionary
rule should not be used for government misconduct that violates a
statute or a regulation. Further, the exclusionary rule should only be
used to deter police misconduct. These two issues will be explored
below.

Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 348 (2006); see also United States v. Caceres,
440 U.S. 741, 754–57 (1979).
226 Dreyer, 804 F.3d at 1279.
227 Id. at 1279–80.
225
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A. The Exclusionary Rule and Violation of
Statutes
The exclusionary rule is an extraordinary remedy, one that should be
used as a “last resort.”228 It should not be used for a violation of a statute.229 There is a simple reason for this: Congress declined to write the
exclusionary rule into the statute they created. Congress created the
statutory rules that govern police and military behavior when it
enacted the Posse Comitatus Act. Congress also determined the consequences for violating its rules—offenders could be fined and imprisoned for violating the act. Congress chose to use criminal sanctions to
punish persons for using the military as law enforcement. The
Supreme Court in Herring and Davis held that courts should use the
exclusionary rule for constitutional violations, not statutory
violations.230
Congress could have written an exclusionary rule into the Posse
Comitatus Act, and Congress could also have added an exclusionary
rule to the act in the 140 years since it became law. Congress wrote
exclusionary rules into other statutes in the last 140 years.231 Since
Congress has not chosen to specifically exclude any evidence derived
from the use of the military to enforce the laws, the courts should not
presume that Congress wants exclusion of evidence as a remedy.
Evidence derived from a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act should
be admissible in a criminal trial.

B. The Exclusionary Rule and Deterring
Police Misconduct
Excluding evidence resulting from the misuse of the military in civilian law enforcement does not deter future police misconduct.
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 589 (2006).
See Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 34–49.
230 See e.g., Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–37 (2011) (primary purpose of
exclusionary rule is to deter Fourth Amendment violations); Herring v. United States,
555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (primary purpose of exclusionary rule is to deter Fourth
Amendment violations).
231 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (2016); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1806, 1825, 1845 (2016).
228
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Violations of the Posse Comitatus Act occur when the military is used
to execute the law.232 Often, as was the case in Dreyer, the military
violates the Posse Comitatus Act without the request or assistance of
law enforcement.233 Civilian law enforcement obtained a search warrant, arrested, charged, and prosecuted Dreyer only after the military
violated the Posse Comitatus Act—no civilian law enforcement official requested the military to execute the law.234 Therefore, the courts
should not punish civilian authorities when the military violates the
law.
Excluding evidence will not deter future military misconduct. In
Dreyer, the military turned illegally obtained evidence over to civilian
law enforcement because it had no connection to the military. Since
the military did not have an interest in the prosecution of the case,
excluding the evidence would not impact the military. Using the exclusionary rule in a civilian prosecution does not deter future military
misconduct. Excluding evidence would punish civilian law enforcement for the misdeeds of the military even though civilian law
enforcement never participated or requested the improper military
actions. Since the actions were done by the military, civilian law
enforcement cannot be deterred by the exclusion of evidence. Since
the prosecution is by civilians, it is unlikely that the military will be
deterred from future conduct that violates the Posse Comitatus Act.
Therefore, excluding evidence is not an effective deterrent.
Criminal punishment for those who misuse the military is an
effective deterrent. Military commanders who use the military for domestic law enforcement can be sent to prison and fined. Although
criminal prosecutions of military commanders are very rare, the mere
fact that a commander could face prison can cause the commander to
refrain from unlawful conduct. This is a significant deterrent, and the
courts should respect the legislative process by refusing to add additional sanctions. It is Congress’s role to decide what the appropriate
punishment is for the statutes that it enacts.

See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2016).
United States v. Dreyer, 804 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
234 Id. at 1270–71.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has struggled with the proper application of the
judicially created exclusionary rule, and the Court has restricted its
application in recent years. The exclusionary rule should be used in
limited circumstances when police violate the Constitution, and when
excluding the evidence gained through a constitutional violation
would deter future police misconduct.235 The Posse Comitatus Act
criminalizes the use of the military to execute the law, and deters misuse of the military through criminal sanctions.236 Both the exclusionary rule and the Posse Comitatus Act are deeply rooted in U.S. history,
and both were created to ensure that government officials act in ways
that protect civil liberties. However, these doctrines must not be
mixed. The exclusionary rule should not be applied to exclude
evidence derived from a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act.

See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–38 (2011) (citing Hudson v. Michigan,
547 U.S. 586, 596 (2006)).
236 18 U.S.C. § 1385.
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